the war of narratives

30. 03. 2008

Uncle Sam in Iraq: the war of narratives

The United States occupation of Iraq is five years old. Has it played the role of a bumbling fool or a conniving neo-colonial? Robert Springborg assesses the argument over America’s role and future in one of the most contested of all modern wars.

Two contradictory narratives of the United States role in Iraq have existed since its forces’ occupation began to sour shortly after the invasion in March-April 2003. The first casts Uncle Sam as a bumbling, ignorant giant who, having “broken Iraq”, has no other course but to try to fix it. In this circumstance, fear of the consequences of sudden retreat keep the American Gulliver pinned to the Iraqi ground. If only security could be restored, Uncle Sam would happily depart.                                     

This narrative is the dominant one. It is supported by a plethora of books and articles that chronicle the Clancy Cops-like incompetence of the Bush administration. Many of them are written by key architects of the invasion and occupation, each of whom point the finger of blame at the other. Douglas J Feith, who helped orchestrate the debacle from his post in the department of defence, is only the latest to join in this blame game. His massive tome, War and Decision, derides Colin Powell and most of his state department, Condoleezza Rice and the National Security Council, George Tenet and his CIA, General Tommy Franks, L Paul Bremer and other prominent US decision- makers; only Feith’s own boss and patron, defence secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, is exempt from scorn.                                                                             

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